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fucure corporate crime. We first need to focus on those who own stock. By
educating and encouraging stockholders to own stocks for longer periods of
time, we shiftt. the prevailing atticude ro where stocks represent investment,
nor gambling. By focusing attention on changing corporate cultures that
seem to encourage crime, we can make it less likely that an individual will
~eel the ~ressure. to commit a crime in such an environment. Further, by
1ntroducmg the 1dea of trust back into corporate culture, we can stop corporate crime before it occurs. Finally, by prosecuting corporations and individuals with sanctions that will actually have an effect, we can make the cost
of crime too high for chose that would commit it in the face of stockholders' desires and a trust-centric corporate culture. Through chis multitiered
appro~ch we can wor~ rowa.rds a more effective means of preventing corporate cnme and make Jt poss1ble for American businesses to regain the confidence of the investing public.

Lawyers: The Key to Instilling
Trust in Corporate America
Robert Snyder*'

The possibilities offraud occur at the moment when an attorney needs to work
out the details of an agreement while under tremendous pressure ji-01n his or
her client . .. [to} work around laws to reach company goals.

he year is 200 1 and Americans feel betrayed. Major corporations have
swindled them out of their money. Investors watch in horror as these
public companies file for bankruptcy. T he shareholders know the chances
of their money being returned are slim. Many of the stockholders have put
their life savings into corporations such as Enron and WorldCom that are
now paying major settlements for fraud. Nor only are these corporations
leaving the American people's portfolios empry, but they are also robbing
them of their trust. As a result, investments in the market plummet. The
economy is in a state :of turmoil. Everyone wants ro know what caused
the corporate chaos. The finger naturally points ro those occupations within the fraudulent companies that have been exposed.

T

RE.SPONSIBILITY FOR FRAUD

Former Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) chairman Harvey Pitt
points the finger at attorneys. He says, "One of the biggest disappointments for
me since I can1e to the SEC has been observing the way lawyers are often involved in violations of securities laws." 1 Pitt's statement appears to have weight,
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1 Megan Barncrr, "How ro Account for Lawyers," US. News and rflorld Report,
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Brigham Yotmg University Prelaw Review

22

[Vol. 18

with major law firms making large settlements our of courr. Among those firms
are Jennings, Strouss, & Salmon and Baker & Hostetler. 2 These law firms and
others like them often find themselves in difficult ethical situations. Corporate
executives are often d1e cause of rhe lawyers' ethical bind because they have
come to see me role of lawyers as "helping businesses getting arotmd me clear
purposes of me law."3 Imagine a major business with millions ofdollars in a corporate deal. A lawyer feverishly works for the business to strucrure the legalities
of its deal. The corporation discovers mere are some loopholes in the security
laws. With the help of their lawyer, the corporation can save a lor of money if
they correctly circumvent the technicalities of the securities laws.
The possibilities of fraud occur at the moment when an attorney needs
to work out the details of an agreement while under tremendous pressure
from his or her client. The attorney's stress comes from the client's insistence
that he or she work around laws to reach company goals.
America's complex legal system requires people in business to rely on (and persuade) arrorneys and accounranrs. T he securities laws are clearly meanr ro check
individual and corporate greed, limiting ir and channeling ir ro socia.Uy useful
ends. However, rhey do so through rhe persons of professional advisors and expens, and, ro pur ir blunrly, rhose experrs are nor doing rheir job. Why? Because
rhey don't know whar rheir job really is or should be.'

Because of this flaw in corporate responsibility, America needed to redefine the roles within a corporation. The result was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
SOLUTIONS TO FRAUD

The Sarbanes- Oxley Act redefines roles, responsibilities, and ethics
within the corporate workplace. By redetlning corporate roles, Congress intends the Act co increase liability for people working in corporate positions
that corrupted America's trust. By increasing the liability for "bad" behavior,
the Act attempts to regain confidence in those occupations that seemed to

Ibid.
Bruce Frohen and Leo Clarke, "Scandal in Corporate America: An Ethical, Nor a
Legal, Problem," USA Today, November 2002, 24-27.
' Ibid.
1

J
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Jay a large role in the fraudulent cases of 2001. As a result of Congress's

~fforrs, President Bush signed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act into law on July 30,
2002.~

In section 307 of the Act, Congress specifically responded to concerns
like Pitt's- about lawyers' involvement in fraud- by including new standards and ethics for attorneys. This section emphasizes lawyers' loyalty to the
company as whole (e.g., employees and investors) rather than individual corporate leaders. Section 307 also requires lawyers tO re~ort "evid.::1ce. o~ a material violation of securities law or breach of fiduCJary duty wnhm the
company tO me chief legal COWlSel or the chief executive officer. If the chief
officers do not respond to the attorney's concern, the attorney will then need
tO report the concern tO me board of direCtOrS- COmprised solely of directors not employed by the comp~ny." Additionally, the Act also calls for the
SEC to create a new code of ethics for corporate attorneys.
In the proposed code of ethic, the SEC plans to require lawyers to make
a "noisy withdrawal." The "noisy withdrawal"" provision requires lawyers ro
resign from a company after they have determined that the company is
guilty of fraud. After resigning, the lawyers must advise rhe SEC of his or
her resignation. The SEC will then conduct an investigation to discover the
reasons for the lawyer's withdrawal. Many critics worry that this rule will
flood the SEC with frivolous resignations after a first inevitable disagreement between lawyers and their dients.9 But a provision within the rule
would drastically reduce the possibili ties of frivolous resignations. The provision states that a lawyers would withdraw from a company only if mey
determine "that a (1) continuing (2) material violation is (3) probable, and
that (4) the general counsel and (5) board are ignoring it." 10 If enacted in

5 Ira Schacrer and Alexandra Scheibe, "Why Lawye rs Should Nor Become Corporate
Watchdogs," !ntemrltional Financial Law Review (September 2002): 12.
• The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 with Analysis (Newark, NJ: Man hew Bender &
Company, 2002), 64.
7
Ibid.
8
Mitchell Pacelle and Michael Schroeder, "Proposed SEC Rules Could Turn
Lawyers into Whisde-Binwers," ~11all Street journal (eastern Edition), January 9, 2003, Al.
• Daniel K. Brockett, ''The Sarbanes- Oxley Act of 2002: What Ir Means for
Business Lirigarors," Securities Regulation Law journaL 30 (2002): 360-69.
•• Mike France, 'The SEC's Plan Shouldn't Make Lawyers Squawk," Business Uleek,
January 27, 2003, 54.
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this way, the "noisy withdrawal" provision under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
would guarantee increased trust in corporate America.

Two CASES FOR THE "NOISY W ITHDRAWAL" PROVISION
This Act would put lawyers on the company's side (i.e., investors) instead of on the executives' side. The benefits of having lawyers defending the
right interests, by merely pointing a finger in the general direction of fraud,
can be immense. In one such case, the SEC could have prevented one of the
largest insurance fraud cases in history had they heeded the advice of an attorney who left them a tip.' 1 In 1992, Terry Davis, the attorney who left the
tip, was pursuing a civil suit against Martin R. Frankel on behalf of several
investors. Terry Davis told the SEC that Frankel, the man they were investigating, was lying to them. The SEC was investigating Frankel for misrepresenting an investing record about his small brokerage firm and using clients'
money for personal expenses. The investigation foc{Ised mainly on just one
of Frankel's funds. After investigating, the SEC settled the case with Frankel
for $200,000. Had the SEC followed Terry Davis's tip, they would have
discovered Frankel was hiding other fraudulent accounts in Swiss bank
accowus under several differenr aliases.
Seven years later, Frankel's name resurfaced. This time he was accused o
fraud that involved upwards of $13 million. Had the SEC taken the heed
of Davis, investors would not have lost $13 million. If more lav,ryers come
forward and the SEC seriously considers their claims, millions of dollars can
be saved for the economy. The Sarbanes- Oxley Act helps both the lawyers
and the SEC coordinate more effectively to prevent such fraud.
With lawyers employing a second set of eyes for the SEC, investors will
be able to have more crust and confidence char corporations are being run
the way they should be. Many of the fallen corporations would not have had
so many problems iflawyers had been required to mal<e "noisy withdrawals."
Problems with Tyco International, for instance, could have been avoided if
its lawyers had spoken up. The SEC exposed Tyco International for fraud in
June of 2002. An outside law firm working for Tyco knew about the fraud

11

David Barboza, "Lawyer Says He Told of Fraud Case in '92," New York Times,

July 2, 1999, I.
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early in 2000. The law firm did nothing about the fraud other than inform
their clients that there might be a problem.
The SEC discovered the fraud two years later. '~ Tyco's attorneys should
have stopped representing their client. Yet the attorney's continued representing Tyco even after Tyco persisted in its fraudulent ways. The reason
Tyco's attorneys avoided doing anything was "~here's n~ leg~!. obligatiot~ to
rat out the client . .. and if the documents aren t responstve, Its OK to wtthhold rhem," 13 said Alan Bromberg, a professor at Southern Methodist
University's Law School.
The attorneys and the executives were protected under the attorneyclient privilege. Had lawyers not been tied by the attorney-client privilege,
the Tyco attorneys could have indicated that fraud was occurring by making a "noisy withdrawal." Attorneys' required departure from a company
committing fraud would thereby give investors confidence that investment
dollars were not solely representing the companies executives' interests.
Thus, many argue that the trade-off in fraud cases under the "noisy withdrawal"
rule would be the investor's sense of security for the attorney-client privilege.
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRJVJI.EGE AND "NOISY WITHDRAWAL"

Many argue that trading the attorney-diem privilege for preventing
fraud is not worth the trade-off. "It paints a target on your dient,"14 said
Lawrence J. Fox, a securities litigator in Philadelphia. Many lav<.yers, like
Fox, argue that the "noisy withdrawal" rule puts constraints on client- attorney
relationships. Clients, some attorneys argue, will be unable to n1lly confide in
their attorney because they are afraid that the arrorney will turn and run to
tell the SEC. This complaint is well justified. Without their clients' full support, attorneys will not be able to accurately represent their clients. To
strengthen confidence between attorneys and their clients, no other country
compared to the U .S. has tried to protect the attorney- client privilege quite
so avidly.'5 America believes every client deserves fair and just representation.
" Laurie P. Cohen and Mark Maremom, "E-maiJs Show ' lyco"s Lawyers Had
Concerns-Invesrigarors Examining Memos abom Accouming and Earnings; One Frers
over rhe 'Creariveness,"' Wall Street Joumal (Easrern Edirion), December 27, 2002, C 1.
u Cohen and Maremom, 27.
,. Pacelle and Schroeder, A 1.
' 5 France, 54.
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When corporate lawyers consider protecting their clients however, they
should conside r who their clients really are-the invescor and stockholder
who pay the lawyer's legal fees. Unfortunately, up w1til this point in time,
lawyers have seemed to represent the company executives who were defrauding investors. T he invescors who are paying the attorneys' bills should
be those who receive the legal defense, not the corporate executives. The
"noisy withdrawal" policy under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act would give the
legal defense to the ''true" attorneys' clients. With arrorneys representing
the investors, America's confidence will be regained in corporate America.
On the other hand, concern about lawyers considering investors o r entire corpo rations as their clients instead of the individual corporate leaders,
is that executives will no longer confide in the company's legal representation. "If somebody thinks you are going to expose them, they won't calk to
you," 11' said Alfred P. Carlton, president of the American Bar Association.
T he legal system need not wony about executives failing to confide in their
attorneys. Florida, New Jersey, Virginia, and Wisconsin all require attorneys
to blow the wh isrle on wrongdoing, and no evidence has demonstrated that
executives in those states do not confide in their attorneys.•· Even if business
leaders mistrust their atcorneys, the business executives cannot draft legal
documents. For a corporation co function, in light of all of the technical
legalities and requirements that exist, business executives must confide in
their anorneys. In this way the Sarbanes-Oxley Act defends investors wi thour drastically a ltering relations between attorneys and corporate executives.
Another example within our own legal system supports the "noisy withdrawal" provision under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In 1998, a lawyer named
C harles J. Hecht helped a client named William N. Levy of Voorhees. The
SEC accused Levy of manipulating the stock of Electo-Optical Systems
Corporation, defrauding investors of more than $12 millio n. During the
court hearing, Heche agreed to let his client provide regulators with an accounting of his client's financial dealings. In fall of that same year, the SEC
accused Hecht of allowing Levy to submit an incomplete and misleading accounting. Hecht seeded the case with the SEC, paying a total of more than
$170,000.

" !hid.
I ' Ibid.
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W hen a lawyer for the SEC was asked why it moved so forcefully against
Hecht, he explained, "We don't have vast resources, say like the IRS does or
the Justice Deparonent, to investigate things .. .. We have to be able to rely
on accounting o rdered by the court that are fair and accurate and complete
and not misleading in any respect."" Like the SEC, invesrors' resources are
scarce and limited. Thus, misleading court submissions are not the o nly acts
that should be punished by law. Lawyers submirting legal work for clients
should be held accounrable even if the legal work is nor submitted in a court
of law. Lav.ryers have taken an oath to obey and sustain the law-not to turn
their heads when their clients are misleading the public.
CONCLUSION

Lawyers are the missing link of trust berween the community and the
corporation. They hold high positions of honor and prestige within our nation. They interpret the laws of tl•e land and define the bounds rhat rhe laws
intend Americans to stay within. T he laws give U.S. citizens peace and security by assuring them that businesses are fairly representing themselves.
When those laws are bent and twisted, the trust and confidence they instill
in o ur nation are also bent and twisted. Legal advisors wid1 such awesome
responsibility need to have their jobs more clearly defined. Once attorn~ys:
roles in corporate America are redefined, they will berter balance comparues
pressure for profits with our nation's laws, giving us security. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act with the "noisy withdrawal" provision defines attorneys'
roles well enough to give them the power to uphold o ur laws. When attorneys appropriately use this power, trust will once again be instilled in
corporate America.

,. Diana B. Henriques, "SEC Is Making Lawyers Walk in Clients' Shoes,K New York
Times, June 1, 1999, 1.
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,. Diana B. Henriques, "SEC Is Making Lawyers Walk in Clients' Shoes, ~ New York
Times, June I, 1999, I.

